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Abstract 
 
The effect of globalisation on inflation is modelled and simulated for ten countries 
from G10 during the Great Moderation period. The results are supportive of the 
globalisation hypothesis. In particular, the results show that dynamic channels and 
magnitudes of globalisation to domestic inflation are highly heterogeneous from country 
to country, that increases in trade openness could be either inflationary or deflationary, 
while increased imports from low-cost emerging-market economies have been mostly 
deflationary, and that there has been almost no direct globalisation impact as far as 
inflation persistence is concerned while the impact on inflation variability can be positive 
as well as negative. Overall, globalisation is shown to have contributed positively to the 
aspect of low inflation rather than that of stable inflation during the Great Moderation era. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of globalisation on inflation of the last two decades constitutes one of the 
unsettled issues in the recent debate over the state of macroeconomics in the wake of the 
latest global recession triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. It relates particularly to the 
discussion of whether the state of low and stable inflation in many developed economies 
of the West since the early 1990s, a period referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’ (see 
Bernanke, 2004), should be credited to the success of domestic macroeconomic policies 
or simply to the rising global supply of cheap manufactured goods from those rapidly 
developing economies such as China (see, eg McCarthy, 2007; White, 2008; Bean, 2010). 
Should globalisation be a major factor in driving domestic inflation, standard monetary 
theories of inflation could be invalidated, eg see Wang and Wen (2007).1  
It is a well-known fact that there exists a considerable degree of correlation in the 
inflationary processes among many developed countries, as shown from Table 1 of the 
Western countries of G10. When it comes to econometric model results, however, the 
evidence is inconclusive concerning the hypothesis of whether globalisation has indeed 
significantly contributed to the inflation dynamics of these economies. For example, 
while supportive evidence are presented in Pain et al (2006, 2008), Borio and Filardo 
(2007), Pehnelt (2007), Wang and Wen (2007), and also partially in Ciccarelli and Mojon 
(2010), negative results are reported by Ball (2006) and Ihrig et al (2010). 
The present investigation seeks to sharpen the evidence by improving, in two key 
respects, the empirical rigour of modelling the globalisation effects on inflation. First, 
domestic inflation is modelled at a country-by-country level with a careful choice of the 
variables representing globalisation. The LSE general-to-specific dynamic specification 
approach is adopted to ensure empirical robustness of the end model choice. The G10 
                                                 
1 See also White (2009) for a more general critique. 
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economies except Japan form the objects of our investigation and quarterly data are used. 
Second, model simulations are carefully constructed to illustrate the globalisation effects. 
In particular, a novel simulation is designed to evaluate the disaggregate import effects 
from the low-cost emerging-market economies. The design overcomes a key weakness in 
the existing practice of macro model simulations – the lack of cross-country price level 
differences from the aggregate price indices. 
In short, our modelling experiment has resulted in relatively robust inflation models 
for the most of ten economies during the Great Moderation period. In all the ten cases, 
the responsiveness of inflation to import prices has been statistically significant; and in 
eight out of the ten cases, foreign trade openness has been also found significant. 
Moreover, the model simulation results show that both the trade openness and rising 
imports from the emerging-market economies have exerted sizeable effects on the level 
and variability of inflation but that globalisation has impacted little as far as inflation 
persistence is concerned. On the whole, the evidence that we have produced is 
sufficiently strong to support the globalisation hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes our 
modelling method and the related data issues; the subsequent section discusses our model 
simulation designs and the related data measurement issues; the empirical results 
concerning globalisation are discussed in section 4, which is followed by a short section 
summarising the main findings. 
2. Modelling strategy and data issues 
Most of the existing empirical studies are based on extended Phillips curve models, 
eg Ball (2006), Borio and Filardo (2007), Pehnelt (2007), Ihrig et al (2010), Guerrieri et 
al (2010) and Mihailov et al (2011). One theoretical weakness of the type of Phillips 
curve models is the absence of explicitly specified long-run disequilibrium effect on the 
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inflation dynamics. The long-run effect is included in the form of an error-correction term 
in the models by Pain et al (2006, 2008). We shall follow their step. Analyses based on 
common factor models have also become popular, eg see Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010). 
However, common factor models or correlation-based analyses do not separately identify 
the effects of domestic versus foreign factors, whereas the separation is crucial in our 
present country-specific investigations. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that 
Ciccarelli and Mojon have employed an error-correction mechanism to relate domestic 
inflation rates to global inflation. 
The issue of how to represent globalisation in models is arguably the most crucial 
here. Various channels of globalisation has been discussed in the literature, such as 
import price path-through, global output slacks, global competition via labour and capital 
markets. However, it is evident from numerous empirical studies that the globalisation 
effect on domestic inflation is mainly through overseas goods market imbalance or 
disequilibrium. Four variables are usually used to capture such imbalance – foreign 
output gaps, trade openness indicators, import price and common factors from cross-
country inflation series. We shall adopt only two here – import price and trade openness 
indicators. Foreign output gaps are disregarded on both theoretical and empirical 
considerations. Theoretically, our aim is to model how much inflation of a specific 
country is affected by foreign markets, rather than how much global inflation is affected 
by global market supply and demanding conditions. Therefore, prices from abroad should 
contain adequate and timely information on the global market conditions. Empirically, 
data on foreign output gaps are not directly collected but indirectly derived. The 
derivation lacks a unanimously accepted formula; and the available modelling evidence 
using the data is disappointing, eg see Calza (2009) and Ihrig et al (2010), owing possibly 
to rather high degrees of measurement errors involved in the derivation. Global inflation 
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is derived from common factor models in Mumtaz and Surico (2008), and also Ciccarelli 
and Mojon (2010). The latter study further uses the common factor as a leading indicator 
to predict inflation of each country in a panel of twenty-two developed economies. While 
latent common factors do capture certain amount of the global inflationary effect, the 
method suffers from two shortcomings – limited sample representation of global inflation 
through exclusion of mainly the majority of developing economies in panels from which 
the factors are derived, and failure to exclude the inflation data of each economy to be 
modelled from the common factor, making it difficult to identify the factor as purely a 
foreign price variable. 
We thus start the modelling experiment with import price since it is the least 
controversial and the most commonly used variable to capture the foreign trade effect.2 
Denoting itP  as the aggregate price index, itp  its logarithm and itp  as inflation for 
country i under study, we take the following general form of an error-correction model:  
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where itw  is the logarithm of wage index, itW , 
M
itp  the logarithm of the import price 
index, MitP , 
G
ity  the domestic output gap, and itu  the unemployment rate. The wage index 
is used as a proxy of domestic costs, eg see Pain et al (2006, 2008). Obviously, it is 
impossible to rule out any foreign impact on wages, as pointed out by Ihrig et al (2010). 
However, simple correlation analyses show that the degree of correlation in cross-country 
wage rates is notably smaller than that of inflation on average, eg see Table 2 versus 
Table 1. It should be noted that (1) resembles an extension of typical augmented Phillips 
                                                 
2 In fact, Pain et al (2008) conclude that the indirect effect through import prices seems to be the only 
channel through which foreign economic conditions affect consumer price inflation. 
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curve models by an 1itec  term. Here, model (1) also generalises model [A1.1] in Pain et 
al (2006) in three aspects: (a) It does not impose static homogeneity in the 1itec  term; (b) 
it allows for more than one lag of Gity ; and (c) it considers itu  since it was a key variable 
in the original Phillips’ curve prior to the invention of Gity  and since empirical evidence 
of the role of Gity  has not been unquestionably strong. However, model (1) excludes 
certain variables, such as energy and food price inflation, which have been considered in 
the literature, eg see Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al (2010). The exclusion is 
based on the observation that inflation series of these prices tend to be considerably 
correlated with those of import prices, as shown in Table 3. The correlation makes it 
incoherent not to interpret the significance of the food and energy price inflation 
variables as evidence of globalisation.  
Obviously, ij  and 2i  in (1) form our parameters of interest here and evidence of 
0ij  and/or 02 i  is confirmatory of the globalisation hypothesis. However, a more 
interesting and specific facet of the hypothesis is that the impact of Mitp  could increase 
with the growth of trade while the roles of those domestic factors decrease. Many 
existing studies test the facet by comparison of sub-sample estimation results, which 
basically follows the time-varying parameter approach. Unfortunately, the approach 
suffers from the drawback of neglecting the possibility of time-varying parameter 
estimates being the result of model mis-specification. It also makes it difficult to further 
apply models for simulation or projection purposes. Hence, we intend to try and obtain 
constant-parameter models by isolating the effect of trade intensification through 
appropriate variable choice. Besides, the limit of our attention to the Great Moderation 
era should help reduce the risk of significant parameter shifts. Specifically, we postulate 
an alternative model to (1) by introducing a trade-ratio based openness index, Oitr , as a 
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measure of increasing import penetration, similar to what Pain et al (2006, 2008) and 
Ihrig et al (2010) have done:  
(2) 
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where weighted variables are denoted by circumflex. For example,  OitGitGit ryy  1~ . 
Noticeably, itW  and 
M
itP  can be weighted by either arithmetic weight or geometric 
weight. The former is adopted here, ie  OitMitMit rPp ln~   and   Oititit rWw  1ln~ , after 
experimenting with both.3 Other variations of (2) should also be possible depending on 
which parameters in (1) are potentially most susceptible to trade-induced shifts. For 
example, Pain et al (2006, 2008) only consider the case of weighted long-run parameters, 
ie: 
(2a) 
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Ihrig et al (2010) experiment with adding weighted Gity~  and 
M
itp~  to an augmented Phillips 
curve models rather than replace the relevant un-weighted variables (their model does not 
have the error-correction term). We shall experiment with several variations of model (2) 
with different mixture of weighted explanatory variables, for example, one with only the 
short-run variables weighted and another with only the long-run variables weighted. 
Many existing studies adopt simply the a priori dynamically specified inflation 
models, for example those which follow the New Keynesian theoretical approach. We 
believe it mainly an a posteriori matter to appropriately specify the dynamic structure of a 
                                                 
3 We find models with geometric weighted variables usually result in larger residuals and much worse 
simulation results than models with arithmetic weighted variables. 
 8
model, especially its short-run structural part, see Hendry and Richard (1982, 1983), 
Hendry et al (1984). In order to search for empirically robust model specifications, 
especially in the present case where we face multiple possible model variations, it is 
essential to put in place a set of criteria for model choice. The criteria that we adopt are 
based on the LSE general-to-specific model specification approach, see Hendry (1995). 
Specifically, model reduction via ‘testimation’ by the general-to-specific approach is 
carried out for (1) and several variations of (2). The resulting simplified models are 
assessed especially for having (a) correct signs of the long-run parameters and the 
negative feedback parameter of the 1itec  term, and (b) relatively constant parameter 
estimates, in addition of passing all the commonly used diagnostic tests. When more than 
one such data-coherent model is found for one country, encompassing tests are performed 
to assist the end model selection. 
The above modelling strategy is applied to ten countries of the G10: Belgium 
(BEL), Canada (CAN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), 
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), the UK and the US. Japan is left out here because of 
its post-1990 idiosyncratic experience of deflationary recession, eg see McKinnon and 
Ohno (2001). Quarterly data is collected for the period 1985-2010. Annual inflation, the 
modelled variable itp , is calculated from CPI series in line with most of the existing 
studies. We shall skip a general description of the inflation dynamics since the late 1980s 
up to the recent global recession, because that has been adequately covered in various 
recent studies, such as IMF (2006), Melick and Galati (2006), Pain et al (2006, 2008), 
White (2008) and Bean (2010). The only aspect that we want to emphasise here is that 
there is a visible increase of cross-country correlations in inflation since the late 1990s 
(see Table 1), especially compared to the cross-country wage rate correlations shown in 
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Table 2, and that the increase is coupled with an increase in the cross-country import 
prices, as shown from Table 3.  
There are mainly three ways of defining the openness index: the ratio of imports to 
GDP, the ratio of imports to GDP plus imports and the ratio of imports plus exports to 
GDP plus imports.4 We have tried all three and found from our sample calculation that 
the three carry virtually identical trends with 99% correlation on average. We shall adopt 
the ratio of imports to GDP plus imports as the openness index here for its relative 
closeness to representing import penetration. Figure 1 shows the ten openness series (the 
solid curves), and a rising trend is discernable from the figure of all the countries except 
for Canada prior to the 2008 recession, although the degrees of openness differ a great 
deal across the ten economies, with Belgium and the Netherlands enjoying relatively high 
degrees while the US remaining at a very low degree. Detailed definitions and sources of 
the other explanatory variables in (1) and (2) are given in the appendix. 
Overall constancy of parameter estimates is one of our top concerns. Significant 
shifts of parameter estimates are reported in several of the existing studies. In particular, a 
significant shift is reported in the inflation process of the OECD countries in the mid 
1990s in Pain et al (2006, 2008). To detect such shifts, recursive estimation and 
sequential Chow tests are employed in our initial modelling experiment using the data 
sample of 1985-2010. The experiment has indeed revealed significantly shifting 
parameter estimates during the early part of the sample. To verify that the shifts are not 
just the symptom of initially small subsamples of the recursive estimation procedure, a 
sequence of general-to-specific model reduction experiments is carried out, each with a 
decreased sample by one year from 1985. The experiments show that severe model 
fluctuations have receded once the sample is reduced to 1992-2010. Although our focal 
                                                 
4 The KOF index of globalization compiled by Swiss Economic Institute is used to represent openness in 
Pehnelt (2007). However, the index is only in annual frequency and the series exhibit less variation than the 
three indicators discussed here. 
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concern is the globalisation effect on inflation during the Great Moderation era, we have 
kept the post-2008 observations mainly for the purpose of examining parameter 
constancy. Italy is the only economy which exhibits certain visible parameter shift in 
1995 from recursive estimation. Our finding suggests that much of the model fluctuations 
is probably due to the economic downturn in the West from the late 1980s to the early 
1990s, and the finding also confirms to Bean’s (2009) demonstration of the post-1992 
period being the ‘Great Moderation’ era. Henceforth, we set the data sample to 1992-
2010 for our main modelling exercise. 
Panel or pooled-sample estimation is commonly used in the existing studies. Such 
exercise actually imposes identical key parameters and homogeneous model format. To 
assess the validity of those imposed assumptions, we conduct general-to-specific model 
reduction on individual countries first before considering the possibility of applying the 
panel method. It turns out through our extensive model reduction exercise that both the 
model form and parameter estimates vary so considerably across the ten economies, 
including those long-run static parameter estimates, that there lacks adequate basis to 
impose identity on key parameters of interest with panel, pooled-sample or system-of-
equations estimation. Table 4 reports the key regression results from the model reduction 
exercise. The model versions given in the table are only those which have passed various 
diagnostic and encompassing tests. Most of those routine test results are omitted from the 
table due to lack of space. The parameter estimates in bold indicate that the 
corresponding variables are weighted by the openness index, and therefore the 
corresponding model version is a variation of model (2). It should be noted that UK is the 
only country where two versions are reported, one from (1) and the other from (2), as 
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encompassing tests fail to indicate which one outperforms the other.5 Notice also that 
long-run static homogeneity does not hold for all countries. 
3. Model simulation design and data measurement issues 
Successful search for data-coherent models will not only help shed light on why 
some of the previous empirical studies have resulted so diverse findings, but also enable 
us to conduct counterfactual model simulations to illustrate how much globalisation has 
affected domestic inflation. Such illustrations will facilitate quantitative assessments of 
the dynamic impact of particular driving variables of interest which are otherwise 
difficult to achieve directly from the estimated models. 
The common route of simulating the globalisation effects is via counterfactual 
shocks of certain external price series. For example, a decrease in the import price 
variable by a fixed percentage or a decrease of a major component of the import price 
such as the oil price or the commodity price index, eg see IMF (2006) and Pain et al 
(2006, 2008). However, it is impossible to quantitatively evaluate from those simulations 
to what extent the increasing imports from the relatively low-cost emerging market has 
affected inflation in the developed economies. Nickell (2005) and Pain et al (2006, Box 1) 
propose to evaluate the impact of imports from a certain group of countries by making 
use of the individual foreign price and trade weight components of the import price 
variable of a country under study. However, neither study has actually carried out a 
simulation along this line to illustrate the import impact from the emerging markets. 
Here, we shall extend their proposed method to try and design simulations which 
will illustrate quantitatively how much the low inflation episode in the ‘Great 
Moderation’ era was related to the relatively low priced goods imported from the 
                                                 
5 Note that the long-run relation is identical for both models (1) and (2) in the UK case. 
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emerging markets. To that end, we first construct an import price series for each country 
using the export prices of most of the trading partners to country i: 
(3)  
i
N
j
X
jtjt
M
it pwP 


 
1
expˆ  
where Xjtp  denotes the US dollar denominated export prices in logarithm of those foreign 
countries trading with country i and jtw  their trading weights. We aim at having the 
constructed price series in (3), when converted into the domestic currency, approximate 
well of MitP , ie 
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The decomposition will enable us to carry out counterfactual simulations through fixing 
the values of EtW  and Et  respectively to evaluate the direct impact of imports from the 
emerging-market economies. 
Thirty-two economies are included in the trade set for the calculated import prices 
by equation (3) (see the appendix for the list and data sources). In addition to the eleven 
countries of the G10, the rest economies are selected because of their relatively high 
ranks in import shares of the ten G10 countries to be modelled according to the Direction 
of Trade data released by the IMF. These include Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, China, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Libya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Turkey, Canada, Hong Kong, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States and Taiwan. The trade set covers about 80% of the total imports 
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for each of the G10 country on average. The closeness of these calculated import price 
series to the published import prices are shown in Figure 2. To further decompose the 
calculated prices by (4), the trade set is divided into two subsets, with the developed 
economy set comprising the G10 plus Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Portugal and Spain, and the rest forming the emerging-market set.  
Now, a major problem arises when it comes to the decomposition equation (4): all 
the individual country export price indices are based on 2005=100, which effectively 
removes the differences in the aggregate price levels between the developed economies 
and the emerging-market economies. In other words, aggregate price indices reflect no 
information on the purchasing power parity (PPP) between countries by definition. To 
circumvent the problem, we make use of the PPP conversion factors for the year 2005 
estimated by the World Bank (2008, Table 1.a) for around 150 countries. We are aware 
of the imprecise nature of using the World Bank factors here as these factors are 
estimated on the basis of both the service and goods prices of the domestic economies 
concerned while the price indices that we intend to convert are export prices only. But 
these factors are the best available aggregate ones and it is not unrealistic to assume that 
the export price level of an economy should be at par with its domestic price level in 
general. From a cross-section sample perspective, the World Bank estimates can be 
regarded as providing a set of PPP-based weights on the cross section of year 2005, 
whereas the panel of aggregate price indices which have been used in the calculated price 
series assume equal weights for all economies in 2005. Provided that the sample of 32 
economies in our panel is adequately representative of the World Bank sample, 
recalculation of the price series by reweighting the individual price series using the 
World Bank PPP-based factors should not generate substantial differences from the result 
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using the un-weighted ones.6 Figure 3 illustrates the decomposed series of Et  and Dt  
calculated by using the World Bank PPP-based factors to reweight all the export price 
series of the emerging-market economies in our trade subset. Noticeably, the gaps 
between the two sets of series are as wide as 50 on average.  
Since for a few emerging market economies, the earliest available trade data start 
in 1994. Our counterfactual simulations are run for the period of 1994Q1 to 2008Q3, ie 
the main part of the Great Moderation era prior to the latest global recession. We begin 
by running a baseline simulation in which we substitute the actual series of the import 
price indices by those series constructed by (3).7 This is to separate the errors owing to 
the deviations of the calculated indices from the actual indices out of the subsequent 
simulations. Next, three scenarios are designed to illustrate the globalisation impacts of 
three factors respectively: (i) the openness index by setting Oitr fixed to its initial value at 
the beginning of the simulation, (ii) the trade shares by setting EtW  to its initial value at 
the beginning of the simulation and (iii) the disaggregate import prices by setting 
Et = Dt . Figures 4-6 and Table 5 summarises the simulated results. 
A word of caution is necessary here before we move on to the next section. 
Simulations are limited by the models on which they are based. Here, the formulation of 
models (1) and (2) restricts our simulations at least in two respects. First, the indirect 
impact of import prices via labour costs, productivity gains through competition and 
other channels is beyond our simulations; second, the aggregate and dynamic features of 
the models make it impossible to separate out the individual contributions of Et  versus 
Dt  entirely. 
                                                 
6 The recalculation is tried for several of the G10 countries and the results show that the un-weighted and 
the weighted series are indeed very close.  
7 Our baseline simulation is in fact very close to the actual CPI series because of both the small residuals in 
our estimated equations and the relatively good fit of our calculated import price series to the actual ones 
(see Figure 2). 
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4. Empirical results of globalisation effects 
We are now in the position of discussing the globalisation effects found from the 
econometric exercise. First, let us examine the relevant parameter estimates in Table 4. It 
is remarkable that all the countries except Sweden and the US fit in with model (2). Of 
the import price variable, the effects are of the globalisation-intensified type, ie the 
openness-index weighted type for six out of the ten countries in terms of the short-run 
variable and for six to seven of them in terms of the long-run variable. Moreover, 
unemployment variable is found to be the openness-index weighted type in the cases of 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands; the domestic output gap variable is found to be the 
openness-index weighted type in the cases of Italy and the UK; and the short-run wage 
rate variable falls also into the type in the cases of Canada, France, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. If we focus ourselves on the import price variable irrespective of the 
openness index specification, we find that the long-run import price effect is present in all 
but the Italian models, and that the effect is stronger than that of the wage variable in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. A closer examination reveals that 
these four countries share the common features of both having their openness indices 
well above 30% and their shares of import from the emerging-market economies greater 
than 15% (see Figure 1). To a certain extent, the short-run import price effect is more 
striking. It is not only present in all the ten cases but also dominantly positive, with 
virtually an accelerative effect for more than half of the cases (ie close to the 
specification of jtMp   with a positive coefficient). Hence on grounds of model (1), the 
evidence constitutes an over overwhelming case for the globalisation hypothesis. Even if 
on grounds of (2), the case is adequately strong. 
Our results on the role of import price are in broad agreement with those reported 
in Pain et al (2006, 2008), although our long-run parameter estimates show too distinct 
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heterogeneity to support their grouped estimates or assumed homogeneity. Nevertheless, 
it is clear from Table 4 that omission of the long-run effect is a model specification error 
in those studies which only consider short-run Phillips curve inflation models. It is also 
clear from the table that the lag structures of the short-run variables are more complicated 
and heterogeneous than what have been assumed in most of the previous empirical 
studies. 
Let us now look at the simulation results given in Figures 4-6 and Table 5. Figure 4 
shows how inflation would have differed from the baseline inflation if the trade openness 
had remained unchanged at the 1994Q1 level, O Qi
O
it rr 11994 . There are only eight series in 
Figure 4, since the Swedish and the US models are the simple type without the openness 
effect, as shown from Table 4. It is discernible from Figure 4 as well as Table 5 that the 
impact of the openness variable, Oitr , on inflation vary considerably from country to 
country, except for inflation persistence where there the impact is negligible (see Table 5), 
and that increases in openness have a deflationary impact for Italy, a negligible impact 
for the UK, a fluctuating impact for France, Belgium and Canada and a relatively strong 
inflationary impact for Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. As mentioned above, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland share the features of having the long-run 
import price parameters larger than the wage parameters and of being more open to the 
emerging market economies. The simulated inflationary impact by openness can be 
interpreted as reflecting the fact that inflation rates have been generally higher in the 
emerging market economies than the developed countries. On the whole, it is difficult to 
generalise the directional impact of the degrees of trade openness on inflation in terms of 
both its level and its variability. 
In comparison, it is easy to conclude a generally deflationary impact on inflation of 
the rising shares of imports from the emerging market economies. As seen from Figure 5 
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and also Table 5, holding the import shares constant at the 1994Q1 level would result in 
higher inflation, with the maximum impact found for the US (1.4 percentage point), the 
Netherlands (1.2 percentage point) and Germany ( 0.3 percentage point). Although 
generally small and different across the ten countries (ranging from 0.04 to 1.4 
percentage point), the simulated result illustrates clearly that increasing imports from the 
emerging market economies have led to lower inflation in general. However, it is unclear 
if the imports have led to more stable inflation, as shown in Table 5. 
It is natural to relate the deflationary impact of the increasing imports to the 
relatively cheap products by the emerging market economies. Such a price impact is 
examined in the next scenario. As clearly seen from Figure 6 and Table 5, realignment of 
the price levels of the emerging market economies to those of the developed countries 
would cause higher inflation in general and the impact is somewhat stronger than that of 
the previous scenario, although it remains unclear if the lower prices have led to more 
stable inflation. Again, the US, the Netherlands and Germany are the countries which 
demonstrate relatively the largest deflationary impact. Similar to scenario 1, there is little 
overall effects on inflation persistence of scenarios 2 and 3 concerning the disaggregate 
effects by the emerging-market economies. 
Let us now look at the simulation results country by country. In the Belgium case, 
openness had an inflationary impact during 1994-2001 and 2004-2007, but a deflationary 
impact during 2001-2004 (see Figure 4). The overall impact is inflationary and also 
variability enhancing, as shown in Table 5. The impact of the share of imports from the 
emerging market economies is deflationary and very small, with a maximum of 0.04 
percentage point (see Figure 5) or less than 1% difference from the baseline level (see 
Table 5). The impact of the import prices from the emerging market economies is also 
deflationary and small, with a maximum of 0.07 percentage point (see Figure 6) or less 
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than 2% difference from the baseline level (see Table 5). The effects of these two 
scenarios on both inflation variability and persistence are negligibly small.  
In the case of Canada, the openness index had a deflationary impact before 2002, 
and turned to inflationary thereafter, and the switch is most noticeable from Table 5, 
where it is seen to have concurred with a switching impact on the variability. The effects 
of the next two scenarios resemble the case of Belgium, only with larger magnitudes, as 
shown in Table 5. It is also interesting to note that imports from the emerging market 
economies have exerted an overall stabilising effect as far as the inflation variability of 
the full period is concerned. 
The openness impact in the French case is almost the opposite of the Canadian case. 
The impact was mostly positive before the year of 2002, became significantly negative 
during 2002-2004, and returned to positive thereafter (see Figure 4). A notable feature of 
this scenario is the large stabilising effect on the inflation variability, as seen from Table 
5. The deflationary impact of both the share and the price of imports from the emerging 
market economies here resembles the previous two cases, with the exception of the 
period of 1995-1999, where the price impact was considerably bigger.  
Germany tops the group when it comes to the openness impact and the impact is 
notably inflationary, above 60% of the baseline rates on average (see Figure 4 and Table 
5). Again, the deflationary impact of the next two scenarios in the present case is similar 
to the previous cases, only with much larger magnitudes. The impact of the import prices 
from emerging market economies on German inflation is over 30% of the baseline rates 
(see Table 5). It is, however, difficult to judge from the inflation variability statistics if 
the impact has been stabilising inflation. 
Italy poses an opposite case to Germany in the openness scenario. The openness 
variable  has shown clearly a deflationary and stabilising impact on the Italian inflation, 
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with the maximum difference of 1.3 percentage point (see Figure 4) or above 20% of the 
baseline rates (see Table 5). However, the impact of scenarios 2 is found to remain 
extremely small and negative (see Figure 5 and Table 5). The impact of scenario 3 is 
slightly bigger and turns from inflationary to deflationary around 1997 (see Figure 6). 
There is some evidence that both scenarios have helped stabilising inflation (see Table 5). 
The case of the Netherlands is similar to that of Germany as far as the inflation 
rates are concerned (see Table 5). In the openness scenario, the impact remains largely 
inflationary, except for the period 2002-2004 (see Figure 4). In scenarios 2 and 3, the 
deflationary impacts remain visibly strong, especially in the latter scenario, with the 
impact remaining above 1 percentage point since the late 1990s and exceeding 1.5 
percentage point in 2006 (see Figure 6). The only noted difference from the German case 
is the inflation stabilising effect of the first scenario (see Table 5). 
The openness scenario does not apply to Sweden because its end model form 
through model reduction is equation (1). The impact of both the share of imports and 
import prices from emerging market economies is clearly deflationary, about 20% of the 
baseline rates as shown in Figures 5 and 6 as well as Table 5. However, the impact is 
found not to be inflation stabilising (see Table 5). 
Switzerland is another case which resembles that of Germany, only at a smaller 
scale. The impact of the openness variable is both inflationary and variability enhancing 
(see Figure 4 and Table 5), while the impacts of scenarios 2 and 3 are deflationary and 
stabilising (see Figures 5 and 6 and Table 5). 
In the UK case, the openness impact is hardly visible from Figure 4, though it has 
remained above 2% on the inflationary side with a small stabilising effect (see Table 5). 
Again, the impacts in scenarios 2 and 3 are clearly deflationary, with negligible effect on 
the inflation variability, but not quite inflation stabilising. 
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The US is another case where the openness scenario is not applicable. Here, it is 
noticeable from Figure 1 that the openness index of the US remains exceptionally low 
(around 14% on average) as compared to the other nine countries. On the other hand, the 
US enjoys the highest and also fastest growth of the share of imports from the emerging 
market economies (see the dotted line in Figure 1). That helps to explain our simulation 
results from scenarios 2 and 3, which turn out to be both substantially deflationary and 
inflation stabilising (see Figures 5 and 6 and Table 5). The maximum deflationary impact 
of scenario 2 reaches 1.4 percentage point, while that of scenario 3 exceeds 1.5 
percentage point. It is particularly noticeable from Table 5 that relatively low import 
prices from the emerging market economies have helped to reduce the inflation 
variability by over 25%, the largest of all the ten cases.  
5. Concluding remarks 
The econometric exercise has yielded strong and relatively robust evidence of 
globalisation on domestic inflation of ten countries from G10. The evidence is shown in 
terms of both significant coefficient estimates corresponding to variables representing 
globalisation effects and also model simulation results. 
Among the relevant variables, import price has been verified as a key variable. In 
the majority of the ten cases, this variable is found to exert an increasing impact through 
a joint effect with an openness index in the long run and also a roughly accelerative effect 
in the short run. However, our country-by-country model search shows that dynamic 
channels and magnitudes of globalisation to domestic inflation are highly heterogeneous, 
making it questionable the suitability of evaluating the impact of globalisation by panel 
models or a priori tightly parameterised models. 
The heterogeneity is probably most noticeable from the trade openness channel. 
The openness variable drops out from the model reduction in two (Sweden and the US) 
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out of the ten cases and its presence in the rest cases takes a variety of forms. Model 
simulation by controlling the openness variable illustrates that its impact could be either 
inflationary or deflationary in terms of the level of inflation as well as either aggravating 
or alleviating in terms of inflation variability. The result supports White’s (2008) 
conclusion that globalisation could result in episodes of low and stable domestic inflation 
as equally well as episodes of rising and more volatile inflation. 
What we find more homogeneous from the simulation results are (i) the lack of 
globalisation impact on inflation persistence and (ii) a generally deflationary impact 
owing to imports from low-cost emerging market economies. However, there is some 
evidence that the deflationary impact has been gradually diminishing and that its 
associated impact on mitigating inflation variability has been weakening. The finding 
indicates that the rising supply of cheap goods from low-cost emerging market economies 
has indeed made non-negligible contribution to the state of low inflation in the advanced 
economies, but that the benefit does not extend to the state of stable inflation during the 
Great Moderation era. 
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Appendix Data sources and derivation: 
 
CPI: 2005=100, IFS (International Financial Statistics, IMF), except for Germany where 
the data come from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database; annual inflation 
is calculated from these CPI quarterly series. 
Nominal unit labour cost: IFS except for Switzerland where the data come from the 
OECD Main Economic Indicators database. 
Output gap: Deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP; 
Quarterly data from Datastream except for Belgium and Switzerland where the data 
are annual from Datastream interpolated into quarterly ones by the authors.  
Import price index: national currency, derived from converting US$ import price index 
(2005=100) by the appropriate exchange rate; all series from IFS except for France 
where the data is from CEIC database (http://www.ceicdata.com/). 
Export price index in US$: 2005=100; IFS except for China, the Czech Republic, France, 
Libya, Russia and Taiwan; the data for the Czech Republic, Libya and Russia are 
from Datastream, the data for France (export deflator) and Taiwan are from CEIC, 
and the data for China are from He (2010). Those data originally not in US$ are 
first converted into US$ via exchange rate and then rebased to 2005=100. 
Imports, exports and the GDP: national currency, from IFS.  
Exchange rates: national currency/US$, from IFS, period average. 
Trade shares: Calculated from DOT (Direction of Trade, IMF). 
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Figure 1. The openness index, Oitr  (solid line) and the share of import from emerging market 
economies, EtW  (dotted line) 
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Figure 2. Actual import price, MitP  (solid line) and Calculated import price, 
M
itPˆ  (dotted line)  
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Figure 3. PPP based import price calculated for developed countries, Dt  (solid line) and 
emerging market economies, Et  (dotted line) 
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Figure 4. Simulated impact of the openness indices (solid line: baseline inflation; dotted line: 
simulated inflation with Oitr  fixed at the 1994Q1 value) 
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Figure 5. Simulated impact of the shares of imports from the developed countries versus the 
emerging market economies (solid line: baseline inflation; dotted line: simulated 
inflation with EtW  fixed to its 1994Q1 value) 
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Figure 6. Simulated impact of the import prices from the emerging market economies (solid 
line: baseline inflation; dotted line: simulated inflation with DtEt  ) 
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Table 1. Correlation coefficients of CPI inflation 
 1998Q1 – 2010Q3  
 BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
BEL 1 0.37 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.50 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.70
CAN 0.41 1 0.61 0.08 0.77 0.68 0.67 -0.20 0.78 0.69
CHE 0.60 0.32 1 0.72 0.71 0.65 0.75 0.29 0.82 0.72
DEU 0.57 0.06 0.85 1 0.40 0.28 0.42 0.60 0.41 0.44
FRA 0.79 0.50 0.67 0.62 1 0.71 0.81 -0.09 0.78 0.78
UK 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.47 1 0.63 -0.11 0.75 0.75
ITA 0.42 0.12 0.74 0.69 0.62 0.22 1 -0.02 0.82 0.63
NLD 0.40 0.20 0.37 0.47 0.32 -0.09 0.44 1 0.05 0.05
SWE 0.57 0.31 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.19 0.62 0.50 1 0.67
US 0.73 0.60 0.61 0.48 0.71 0.55 0.46 0.20 0.42 1
Note: The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate those which are larger than their corresponding 
coefficients in the lower triangle.  
 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients of wage rates 
 1998Q1 – 2009Q4  
19
92
Q
1 
 ̶  2
00
9Q
4 
BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
BEL 1 -0.44 0.33 0.26 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.36 0.39 -0.04
CAN -0.20 1 -0.37 -0.27 0.22 0.33 0.52 -0.05 -0.08 0.53
CHE -0.04 -0.33 1 0.39 0.25 -0.06 -0.04 0.27 0.51 0.15
DEU 0.47 0.07 -0.11 1 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.57 0.04
FRA 0.19 0.28 0.03 0.42 1 0.02 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.61
UK 0.23 0.25 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 1 0.19 -0.08 0.46 0.25
ITA 0.21 0.49 -0.23 0.16 0.45 0.26 1 0.44 0.29 0.55
NLD 0.46 0.07 -0.14 0.47 0.54 -0.04 0.48 1 0.21 0.37
SWE 0.50 -0.01 -0.03 0.42 0.32 0.56 0.38 0.27 1 0.35
US -0.07 0.40 -0.01 0.33 0.49 -0.18 0.29 0.34 0.01 1
Note: The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate those which are larger than their corresponding 
coefficients in the lower triangle.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients of import prices 
 1998Q1 – 2010Q3  
 
Energy Brent Food BEL CAN CHE DEU FRA UK ITA NLD SWE US
Energy 1 0.89 0.45 0.19 -0.17 0.45 0.37 0.53 0.58 0.24 0.54 0.60 0.36
Brent 0.90 1 0.46 0.30 -0.01 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.69 0.30 0.68 0.69 0.47
Food 0.56 0.54 1 0.19 -0.17 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.12
BEL 0.08 0.23 0.26 1 0.28 0.38 0.66 0.51 0.57 0.36 0.58 0.63 0.48
CAN -0.27 -0.10 -0.20 0.28 1 -0.01 0.47 0.14 0.21 0.38 0.19 0.21 0.41
CHE 0.50 0.56 0.28 0.14 -0.08 1 0.67 0.71 0.78 0.12 0.76 0.76 0.47
DEU 0.28 0.44 0.23 0.57 0.57 0.45 1 0.76 0.84 0.48 0.80 0.89 0.72
FRA 0.50 0.65 0.35 0.43 0.24 0.61 0.79 1 0.83 0.31 0.84 0.79 0.63
UK 0.60 0.73 0.53 0.45 0.25 0.58 0.76 0.77 1 0.50 0.89 0.96 0.70
ITA 0.12 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.42 -0.02 0.46 0.22 0.56 1 0.34 0.54 0.54
NLD 0.49 0.66 0.44 0.46 0.17 0.62 0.70 0.90 0.81 0.27 1 0.86 0.59
SWE 0.60 0.72 0.55 0.54 0.25 0.57 0.83 0.77 0.93 0.56 0.77 1 0.71
US 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.37 0.45 0.21 0.63 0.36 0.53 0.58 0.33 0.58 1
Note: Reuters CRB energy price index; Brent crude from IMF. The coefficients in bold in the upper triangle indicate 
those which are larger than their corresponding coefficients in the lower triangle. 
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Table 4. Key estimates and test statistics from model reduction of the inflation models (1), (2) and (2a):  
 jtp   1itec  jtw   jtMp   jtu   G jty   Residual tests 
Normality [p 
value]
Homogeneity 
[p  value]
BEL 0.726 -0.017 0.4 0.1 0.017 -0.017 -0.003 0.634 3.108 0.248
[.086] [.008] [.007] [.001] [.211] [.979]
[.096] [.081] [.056] [.109]
CAN 0.677 -0.329 -0.072 0.75 0.25 0.072 0.033 -0.02 0.001 0.648 0.039 1.89
[.117] [.118] [.043] [.012] [.011] [.008] [.0004] [.981] [.052]
[.081] [.035] [.048] [.036] [.093] [.126] [.262]
FRA 0.73 -0.171 0.45 0.15 -0.089 0.069 -0.071 -0.002 0.888 1.927 0.886
[.06] [.029] [.027] [.007] [.011] [.0003] [.382] [.624]
[.061] [.049] [.041] [.614]* [.171] [.046]
DEU 0.788 -0.077 0.2 0.3 0.04 -0.027 0.865 2.399 0.792
[.047] [.022] [.007] [.006] [.301] [.612]
[.097] [.227] [.115] [.04]
ITA 0.889 -0.053 1 0 -0.15 -0.177 -0.013 0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.973 5.694 0.527
[.032] [.012] [.043] [.041] [.005] [.001] [.001] [.0005] [.0004] [.058] [.929]
[.038] [.037] [.052] [.035] [.081] [.032] [.031] [.074] [.08]
NLD 0.658 -0.057 0.25 0.75 -0.017 0.015 0.007 -0.009 0.865 4.723 2.009
[.074] [.011] [.005] [.007] [.002] [.002] [.094] [.04]
[.105] [.099] [.024] [.082] [.066] [.053]
SWE 0.764 -0.231 0.1 0.4 0.218 -0.142 -0.001 0.864 0.645 0.609
[.058] [.048] [.025] [.026] [.0002] [.724] [.799]
[.081] [.27] [.076] [.05] [.113]
CHE 0.768 -0.339 -0.2 0.1 0.15 0.016 0.027 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.88 0.619 0.838
[.104] [.094] [.03] [.007] [.005] [.0006] [.0009] [.0006] [.734] [.638]
[.137] [.249] [.187] [.172] [.223] [.16] [.035] [.06]
UK 0.919 -0.379 -0.219 0.7 0.3 0.421 0.098 -0.062 0.004 -0.005 0.919 0.904 1.473
[.085] [.087] [.034] [.079] [.02] [.02] [.001] [.001] [.636] [.194]
[.072] [.081] [.125] [.123] [.035] [.149] [.088] [.071]
0.919 -0.378 -0.206 0.7 0.3 0.421 0.101 -0.063 0.006 -0.007 0.919 0.833 1.315
[.085] [.088] [.032] [.079] [.02] [.019] [.002] [.002] [.659] [.275]
[.073] [.081] [.121] [.127] [.042] [.168] [.112] [.09]
US 0.6 -0.236 0.75 0.2 0.155 -0.08 -0.004 0.01 -0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.954 5.207 1.196
[.088] [.051] [.009] [.017] [.001] [.003] [.002] [.0009] [.0008] [.074] [.307]
[.06] [.04] [.107] [.035] [.03] [.032] [.035] [.046] [.05]
 1  2  1  2  0  1  2 2 1  0 1  2  3  4  4 1  2  3   2R
Note: Statistics in brackets below the parameter estimates are standard errors; the bracketed statistics below the standard errors are Hansen parameter constancy tests(the 
5% critical value being 0.47); parameter estimates in bold are weighted variables. Sample 1992Q1-2010Q3; exception: Belgium up to 2007Q4; Only versions 
reported are those which pass the encompassing tests, with UK having two versions. The short-run coefficient estimates for the import price variable in the 
Belgium case is actually the result of model reduction on an acceleration variable, ie tMp . 
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Table 5. Summary impact on inflation from model simulations 
 Average inflation 
(sample mean in %) 
Inflation variability 
(standard deviation) 
Inflation persistence 
(Marques’s r)  
 1995-2008 2000-2008 1995-2008 2000-2008 1995-2008 2000-2008 
Belgium 1.79 1.85 0.28 0.31 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 1 -4.2% -2.1% -4.2% -6.3% 0.56 0.54 
Scenario 2 +0.7% +0.9% -0.1% -1.0% 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 3 +1.5% +1.8% +0.1% -1.0% 0.55 0.60 
Canada 2.03 2.19 0.36 0.32 0.51 0.49 
Scenario 1 +5.5% -1.9% -7.7% +22.0% 0.53 0.54 
Scenario 2 +4.5% +6.0% +8.2% -2.6% 0.49 0.49 
Scenario 3 +8.6% +9.3% +5.4% -2.0% 0.49 0.49 
France 1.65 1.98 0.63 0.47 0.44 0.51 
Scenario 1 -2.4% +0.3% +29.7% +57.8% 0.55 0.51 
Scenario 2 +2.5% +2.9% +3.0% -1.3% 0.42 0.54 
Scenario 3 +6.2% +2.0% -10.0% -2.9% 0.42 0.51 
Germany 1.45 1.67 0.49 0.43 0.55 0.51 
Scenario 1 -62.2% -60.9% -34.9% -44.1% 0.51 0.46 
Scenario 2 +12.2% +14.4% +8.2% -9.9% 0.47 0.54 
Scenario 3 +31.6% +21.3% -8.6% +12.8% 0.60 0.60 
Italy 2.37 3.24 1.41 0.66 0.36** 0.46 
Scenario 1 +23.7% +20.7% +15.7% +48.3% 0.53 0.46 
Scenario 2 -1.3% -1.5% -1.0% +2.1% 0.38* 0.46 
Scenario 3 -0.1% +1.5% +2.9% +4.1% 0.42 0.46 
Netherlands 2.21 2.56 1.16 1.27 0.64** 0.60 
Scenario 1 -42.7% -34.9% +10.0% +11.0% 0.62* 0.54 
Scenario 2 +24.1% +28.7% +3.7% -15.3% 0.60 0.57 
Scenario 3 +51.3% +47.5% -2.4% -10.0% 0.64** 0.60 
Sweden 1.09 1.31 2.35 1.52 0.56 0.49 
Scenario 2 +17.5% +21.7% -3.1% -4.9% 0.55 0.46 
Scenario 3 +27.8% +23.9% -2.1% -8.9% 0.55 0.49 
Switzerland 0.47 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.51 0.51 
Scenario 1 -46.3% -35.7% -16.3% -16.4% 0.49 0.51 
Scenario 2 +5.7% +4.5% +5.0% +6.6% 0.51 0.51 
Scenario 3 +3.1% +3.6% +7.1% +7.6% 0.53 0.51 
UK 1.94 2.14 1.10 0.95 0.58 0.60 
Scenario 1 -2.3% -2.2% +2.5% +5.2% 0.58 0.57 
Scenario 2 +9.2% +11.1% +0.7% -1.4% 0.56 0.60 
Scenario 3 +15.8% +14.6% -0.7% -0.3% 0.64** 0.60 
US 2.68 3.03 1.01 0.86 0.49 0.40 
Scenario 2 +12.7% +13.5% +7.4% +5.6% 0.49 0.34* 
Scenario 3 +25.0% +19.8% +29.2% +26.0% 0.47 0.40 
Note: Marques’s (2004) measure of inflation persistence, r, is defined as 
T
nr 1 , where n stands for 
the number of times the series crosses the mean during a time interval with T+1 observations. r 
is normally distributed with mean 0.5 and variance of 
T
5.0 . The superscripts ** and * in the 
last two columns indicate the corresponding r exceeding the significance levels of 95% and 90% 
respectively. 
          Of the first four columns, The summary statistics in the first rows of each country are calculated 
from the baseline simulation. The statistics in the rows of three scenarios are calculated as 
percentage differences of the scenarios against the baseline. 
 
